Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information
| Author | : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 31 |
| Release | : 2006 |
| ISBN-10 | : 2854188454 |
| ISBN-13 | : 9782854188455 |
| Rating | : 4/5 (455 Downloads) |
Book Synopsis Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information by : Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche
Download or read book Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information written by Groupe HEC (Jouy-en-Josas, Yvelines). Direction de la recherche and published by . This book was released on 2006 with total page 31 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
