Essays on Information Transmission in Principal-Agent Models
Author | : Anton Suvorov |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : |
Release | : 2008 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:494690749 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Essays on Information Transmission in Principal-Agent Models written by Anton Suvorov and published by . This book was released on 2008 with total page pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: The first chapter explores the "hidden costs of rewards" in a dynamic informed-principal framework. It shows that rewards are "addictive" : once offered, a contingent reward makes the agent expect it in the future. In a long-term relationship there is a two-sided ratchet effect : the principal is concerned about creating addiction for the agent, whereas the agent does not want to appear too enthusiastic. The second chapter suggests a rationale for paying discretionary bonuses in finitely repeated principal-agent interactions. If the principal cannot commit to contingent rewards, he may still pay discretionary bonuses to give the agent credible feedback about his performance. The third chapter investigates the credibility of advice of a broker, who mediates trade between a seller and a buyer and is partially informed about the buyer's valuation. We derive the optimal direct mechanism maximizing the broker's profit, and investigate information transmission in a decentralized mode.