Product Market Competition and Top Management Compensation
Author | : Simi Kedia |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 48 |
Release | : 1998 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:38584061 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Product Market Competition and Top Management Compensation written by Simi Kedia and published by . This book was released on 1998 with total page 48 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This paper examines the effect of competition in the product markets on the design of a firm's governance structure. In oligopolies, profits are not just a function of a firm's own actions but also of the actions taken by rivals. Firms therefore behave strategically and commit to actions which elicit the most favorable responses from rivals. It is shown both theoretically and empirically that firms strategically use incentive features of compensation contracts toalter behavior in product markets. When a firm's output market decisions are strategic substitutes (i.e., marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival's actions) managerial incentives are decreased, while if these decisions are strategic complements (i.e., marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival's actions) managerial incentives are increased. I develop an empirical measure which captures the sensitivity of a firm's marginal profits to changes in its rival's actions. An examination of CEO incentives in the data shows that when decisions are strategic substitutes, CEOs get awarded stock options with lower pay-for-performance incentives, own a smaller percentage of the firm and have a smaller threat of dismissal following bad performance of the firm. On the other hand, when decisions are strategic complements CEOs get higher pay-for-performance incentives from both cash and stock based compensation.