All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions
| Author | : David McAdams |
| Publisher | : |
| Total Pages | : 0 |
| Release | : 2002 |
| ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1375196675 |
| ISBN-13 | : |
| Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Book Synopsis All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions by : David McAdams
Download or read book All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions written by David McAdams and published by . This book was released on 2002 with total page 0 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Every mixed strategy equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a monotone pure strategy equilibrium in asymmetric first-price auctions in which n bidders have affiliated, one-dimensional, atomless types and interdependent values.
