Mechanism Design for Optimal Auctions

Mechanism Design for Optimal Auctions
Author :
Publisher :
Total Pages : 102
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:806140209
ISBN-13 :
Rating : 4/5 ( Downloads)

Book Synopsis Mechanism Design for Optimal Auctions by : Wenying Hu

Download or read book Mechanism Design for Optimal Auctions written by Wenying Hu and published by . This book was released on 2012 with total page 102 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:


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